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Budgetary constraints, as well as the belief that
the private sector can in some circumstances be
more cost-efficient than the public sector, mean
that governments worldwide are using public–
private partnerships (PPPs) to construct and
operate infrastructure. Innovation is an
important factor that can enable the private
sector to provide more cost-efficient services
than the public sector (Spackman, 2002).
However, there are two schools of thought
regarding the application of innovation in PPP
contracts. Some academic studies show that the
private sector is able to provide innovative
solutions to delivering services and
infrastructure (for example Spackman, 2002;
Akintoye et al., 2003; Harris, 2004; Grimsey
and Lewis, 2005). Other studies conclude that
although a private contractor may promise to
introduce innovations, this does not always
happen (for example Ball et al., 2000; Parker
and Hartley, 2003; Klijn and Teisman, 2003;
Reeves, 2003; Fischbacher and Beaumont,
2003; Hurst and Reeves, 2004).
This article examines this dilemma by
analysing the factors that behind innovative
activities by the private sector in PPP contracts.
Model and hypotheses
Four main factors appear to influence
innovation by PPPs:
•Type of risk assumed by the private sector.
•Transfer of design responsibility.
•Provision for penalties if the infrastructure
does not meet the quality factors specified in
the contract.
•Competition between bidders.
Type of risk assumed by the private sector
In any PPP contract, risks should be shared by
the private and public sectors according to
management skills and ability to control risks
(Lemos et al., 2003; Harris, 2004). However,
according to Parker and Hartley (2003), a large
number of risks in PPP projects are managed
better by the private sector. Transferred risks
incentivize private sector contractors to
maximize efficiency (Broadbent and Laughlin,
1999; Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). So the first
hypothesis we investigated (H1) was whether
the type of risk assumed by the private sector
influences innovation in a PPP contract.
Transfer of design responsibility
Private financing generates new technological
ideas for infrastructure design (for example
see Spackman, 2002). According to Grimsey
and Lewis (2005), the transfer of design
responsibility to the private sector encourages
it to explore the innovations that can improve
quality and reduce operating expenses.
Furthermore, Harris (2004) confirmed that
PPPs work better when the private sector is
involved in the design stage of the project. The
second hypothesis, H2, we looked at was
whether: ‘The transfer of design responsibility
to the private sector determines the application
of innovation in a PPP contract’.
Penalties
Since the private sector partner is remunerated
by government only if the services delivered
are acceptable, the private sector is motivated
to provide good work, deliver the service within
the agreed period of time and to save costs
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without sacrificing the quality. According to
Vassallo (2007), the Spanish Public Works
Concession Law 2003, which established the
introduction of bonuses and penalties related
to the fulfilment of certain quality requirements,
has had a major effect on the outcomes of PPP
projects. The contracting terms must include
mechanisms to encourage the bidder to provide
the highest possible level of service, so that
improvements in efficiency are transferred to
the users. If the contractor fails to meet minimum
standards, the public authority will penalize the
contractor or cancel the contract. Hence our
third hypothesis, H3: ‘Provisions for penalties in
the PPP contract determine the application of
innovation in a contract if the infrastructure does
not meet the quality factors’.
Competition
There is a greater probability of reaching
optimum efficiency when there is competition
between companies in the procurement process
(Ball et al., 2000; Akintoye et al., 2003; Grimsey
and Lewis, 2005). Competition encourages
innovative companies to reduce costs, and hence,
the charges to the public sector. The fourth
hypothesis we tested was therefore: ‘Competition
between bidders to carry out a PPP project
determines the application of innovation in a
PPP contract’ (H4).
Methodology
The data we used to test our hypotheses was
from highway concessions (PPP contracts)
awarded to Spanish companies. An electronic
questionnaire was produced with the Spanish
Association of Construction Companies
(SEOPAN) and sent to the nine Spanish
companies that have PPP agreements with the
Spanish government, as well as with governments
from countries in Africa and Latin America.
There is no comprehensive database of the
organizations in Spain that are involved in PPP
projects. Few companies have this type of contract
owing to the large investment necessary which
means that the overall number of organizations
involved can be limited. (The journal, Public
Works Financing, publishes a world-wide ranking
of financing and private management of
infrastructure annually. In 2004, seven of the 10
top companies were Spanish companies; all of
these are included in this article.)
The questionnaire was sent to the concessions
director of the companies. Six companies
responded. A total of 79 contracts were reported
on; 11 of these contracts were not valid for our
research because they did not correspond with
our period of study. Therefore, this article
includes 68 highway concessions in Spain
operating between 1996 and 2005.
The aim of the study is to quantify the impact
of our four hypotheses about factors relating to
innovation in PPP projects. A full description of
the factors and innovation are given in table 1.
Innovation can be measured quantitatively or
qualitatively. Both measures have advantages
and disadvantages and there is no consensus
about which is the best. Our measures are based
on the recommendations of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) manuals: the Frascati Manual, for
analysing R&D activities, and the Oslo Manual,
for analysing other innovative activities. The
Frascati Manual states that ‘R&D activities include
creative work undertaken on a systematic basis
in order to increase the stock of knowledge,
including knowledge of man, culture and society,
and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise
new applications’ (OECD, 2002, p. 30). R&D
activities in the public works sector include
creating new applications for traffic control:
including providing information to users, tolls
and guaranteeing safety, quality and comfort.
The Oslo Manual states that ‘innovation is
the implementation of a new or significantly
improved product (good or service), or process,
a new marketing method, or a new
organizational method in business practices,
workplace organization or external relations’
(OECD, 2005, p. 46). Innovative activities in
this case include industrial engineering or
industrial design, commercial innovation or
organizational innovation.
The characteristics of each measure of
innovation are included in table 2.
Initially a factor analysis (component analysis)
was applied for the dependent variable
‘innovation’ and the independent variables ‘risk’
and ‘penalty’. Our purpose was to identify
factors that explain the variables with a minimal
loss of information. Subsequently, and with the
aim of verifying whether the proposed factors
determine innovation in PPPs, a multiple
regression analysis was applied. This technique
allowed us to explain a dependent variable by
means of the values of several independent
variables. The relative importance of each
explanatory variable for the dependent variable
was determined (amount and direction),
together with the relationships between the
independent variables.
Results
For the purpose of verifying the suitability of
factor analysis, Bartlett and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) tests were carried out for each variable.
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For the variable ‘innovation’, Bartlett’s test had
an approximate chi square value of 378,903
and KMO 0.606. For the variable ‘penalty’,
Bartlett’s test had an approximate chi square
value of 255,832 and KMO 0.766. Finally, the
variable ‘risk’ had an approximate chi square
value of 107,358 and KMO 0.672. These results
allow us to conclude that the information is
appropriate for the performance of factor
analysis.
As can be seen in table 3, three factors were
extracted for innovation, with a total explained
variance of 92.94%: ‘other innovative activities’,
‘R&D activities’ and ‘number of innovations’.
Regarding the type of risk assumed by the
private sector, a single factor was obtained,
‘type of risk’, which explains 63.12% of the total
variance. This factor includes different risks
assumed by the private sector such as
construction risk (for example the quality and
duration of the work, insolvency of suppliers
and construction costs overrun), financial risk
of the project (inflation rate volatility, availability
of finance and high finance cost), operational
risk (low operating productivity and
maintenance costs higher than expected) and
demand risk. In the analysis of penalties, only
one factor was obtained, ‘penalty’, which
explains 82.89% of the total variance. It includes
different penalties if the private contractor
does not meet the minimum requirements for
quality, design, duration of the work and
environmental conditions agreed in the
contract. The numbers of factors were calculated
by means of the latent root criterion. For the
analysis of the reliability of all the analyses,
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was calculated,
obtaining in all cases values higher than the
minimal allowed 0.6. Therefore the internal
consistency of each one of the factors was
ratified.
Multiple regression analysis was applied to
verify and to quantify whether the factors
proposed in our model are determinants of
Table 1. Factors affecting innovation.
Name Variable Definition Scale
Private sector risk CONRISK Construction risk Ordinal
FINRISK Financial risk Ordinal
OPERISK Operational risk Ordinal
RELRISK Relations between public and private sectors risk Ordinal
DEMRISK Demand risk Ordinal
ENVRISK Environmental risk Ordinal
Transfer of design
responsibility DESRISK Design risk Ordinal
Provision for penalties QUAPEN Quality penalty Ordinal
DESPEN Design penalty Ordinal
DELPEN Delay in the building work penalty Ordinal
ENVPEN Environment penalty Ordinal
Competition between
bidders NUMBID Number of companies bidding for the public contract Metric
Innovation RDEXP R&D expenditures (% sales) Metric
INNEXP Other innovative activities expenditures (% sales) Metric
RDPERS Number of working hours in R&D (% total working hours) Metric
INNPERS Number of working hours in other innovative activities
(% total working hours) Metric
INNPROD Number of product innovations Metric
INNPROC Number of process innovations Metric
Table 2. Characteristics of the measures of innovation.
Measure Characteristics
Innovative activities expenditures (% sales) Measure of the financial investment
More objectivity than number of innovations
Number of working hours in innovative Measure of human resources
activities (% total working hours) Weighting is possible
More objectivity than number of innovations
Measure of tacit knowledge
Number of innovations Measure of marketed innovations
It is possible to account for the sales of new products
Measure of the final result of the innovation
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innovation in PPP projects. The correlations
between the independent variables were low. A
more important correlation exists between
RISK and DESRISK. They are included in our
article because others authors consider them to
be important factors and it is interesting to find
out how they feature in Spanish companies.
The tolerance index and the variance inflation
factors (VIF) were examined. No significant
multi-collinearity problems were found between
the independent variables.
Three multiple regression analyses were
carried out, and the results are shown in table
4. The dependent variable of model 1 (R&D
activities) has a significantly high relationship
(74.20%). All the variables were significant,
with the exception of the transfer of design
responsibility. This result supports the general
proposition that innovation is not an intrinsic
characteristic of PPP projects, but there are
factors that determine the introduction of
innovation by the private sector in these
projects. Therefore, results show a relationship
between R&D activities in PPP projects and
three factors: type of risk assumed by the private
sector, provisions for penalties against the
private contractor and competition between
bidders.
The dependent variable of model 2 (other
innovative activities) is not significant. These
results allow us to conclude that PPPs can be
more related to R&D activities. The dependent
variable of model 3 is the number of innovations,
as consequence of both R&D activities and
other innovative activities. Only the variable
‘penalty’ was significant at a 0.05 level.
The variable ‘type of risk’ is significant at
0.01 in model 1. This result indicates that the
type of risk assumed by the private sector is a
determinant of R&D activities in PPP projects.
The construction, financial, operational and
demand risks assumed by the private sector
can affect the innovative activity of the private
contractor. Although the result supports the
first hypothesis (H1), it is necessary to take into
account that this hypothesis can only be proved
for R&D activities.
The variable ‘transfer of design
responsibility’ is not significant in any case. In
other words, it does not have a significant
relationship with innovation in PPP projects.
The second hypothesis (H2) is not accepted.
This might be explained by the fact that part of
the explanation of design risk is inside the
general risk. There is a certain correlation
between both variables as has been mentioned
Table 3. Final variables extracted from factor analysis.
Variable Name Description (original variables)
INNACT Other innovative activities Other innovative activities expenditures
Number of working hours in other innovative activities
RDACT R&D activities R&D expenditures
Number of working hours in R&D
INN Number of innovations Number of product innovations
Number of process innovations




PENALTY Penalty Quality penalty
Design penalty
Environment penalty
Delay in the building work penalty
Table 4. Results for multiple regressions.
Innovation Variables Coefficients T-value
RDACT Constant -10.167  -5.178*
(model 1) RISK  0.724  5.478*
DESRISK  0.211  0.601
PENALTY  0.514  4.084*
NUMBID  0.708  8.608*
R2  0.742
Adjusted R2  0.725
F value  45.261*
INNACT Constant  -0.561  -0.285
(model 2) RISK  0.079  0.592
DESRISK  0.250  0.709
PENALTY  0.034  0.271
NUMBID  -0.126  -1.529
R2  0.059
Adjusted R2  0.000
F value  0.992
INN Constant  2.453  2.596**
(model 3) RISK  0.071  1.111
DESRISK  -0.156  -0.924
PENALTY  -0.150  -2.478**
NUMBID  -0.063  -1.159
R2  0.165
Adjusted R2  0.112
F value  3.115**
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.05
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previously.
The variable ‘penalty’ is also significant at
0.01 in model 1. The provision for penalties
affects the progress of R&D activities in PPP
projects. This result indicates that the third
hypothesis can be confirmed, although only
for the case of R&D activities (it is not significant
in model 2). In model 3, the variable ‘penalty’
is also significant, but not with the expected
relationship: in fact, it is negative. The result
indicates that the provision for penalties is
positively related to a preliminary effort to
carry out R&D activities in PPP projects, but
this relationship does not result in new
technologies. The variable ‘number of
innovations’ includes both R&D activities and
other innovative activities, hence the results
obtained in model 3 may not be comparable to
model 1 (which only includes R&D activities)
and to model 2 (which only includes other
innovative activities). In other words, model 3
is the combination of models 1 and 2, although
it uses measurements of results and not of
innovative effort.
The results may indicate that although a
private contractor will make an effort to invest
in R&D activities, this effort materializes in
more conservative performances which do not
entail radical innovation. The purpose of the
private contractor is to make sure that the
quality of the work is simply that specified in
the contract. The generation of major
innovations could, in case of failure, risk the
outcome of the quality required in the PPP
contract, which may result in a penalty.
The variable ‘competition between bidders’
is significant at 0.01 in model 1 indicating that
the competition and rivalry among companies
can affect R&D activities in PPP projects. The
bidders seek to propose profitable innovative
projects to the government. A competitive
market between bidders will ensure that the
best option will be selected. The results support
the fourth hypothesis, but only in the case of
R&D activities.
Although Ball et al. (2000) and Lemos et al.
(2003) conclude that innovation is limited in
PPP projects, our results indicate that,
distinguishing between R&D activities and other
innovative activities, R&D activities do influence
PPP projects.
Conclusions
A government will sign a PPP contract if it
believes that the private sector will provide
more efficient services than the public sector.
Innovation activities are an important way of
achieving efficiency. However, there is
contradictory evidence in the academic
literature about the existence of a relationship
between PPPs and innovation—it is not an
intrinsic characteristic of PPP projects but it is
an important feature to have. This article has
made an important contribution by
investigating the determinant factors that can
influence the innovative process in a PPP
contract.
We produced a model to look at four
characteristics in PPP contracts that might
determine whether innovation activities are
carried out by private contractor: type of risk
assumed by the private sector; transfer of design
responsibility; provision for penalties against
the private contractor if the infrastructure does
not meet the quality requirements specified in
the contract; competition between bidders. The
model was applied to a sample of 68 highway
concessions in Spain (PPP contracts) between
1996 and 2005. They are companies with an
important international presence, especially in
Africa and Latin America.
The results show a significant relationship
between three characteristics of PPPs and R&D
activities. The first factor is the type of risk
assumed by the private sector. This risk can be
related to quality problems, supply insolvency,
increase of financial costs, reduction in
productivity, demand problems and so on. If
this risk is assumed by the private sector, the
market mechanism generates the need for
investment in finding new ways to manage
possible contingencies.
A market mechanism appears again if there
are a large number of companies bidding for
the public contract. This is the second factor.
Applying innovative methods and techniques,
based on R&D activities, will give a competitive
advantage.
The third factor is the existence of penalties
if there are quality, design, delay or
environmental problems. The presence of
penalties is a sufficient motivation to encourage
R&D activities by companies—it is unnecessary
to actually apply the penalties. The outcome of
a contract may influence future contracts.
Designing a PPP project with these
characteristics will result in companies putting
major efforts into R&D activities. This is
important for governments to know.
We do not know whether these
characteristics have influence on other types of
innovative activities, such as commercial or
organizational innovation. This is because the
information available to us is limited by he fact
that the topic of innovation in PPP projects is
very new and there are few companies who
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have this type of contract because of the large
investment required. Also we have only analysed
highway concessions. It would be interesting to
test the consistency of the results by analysing
other types of contracts, such as schools,
hospitals or prisons.
Despite these limitations, we believe that
our findings are significant because there have
been very few studies analysing innovation in
PPPs. Of the few that exist none of them focused
on explaining directly the impact of the factors
that can determine innovation in PPPs.
Moreover, all of the articles are basically case
studies, whereas our article is a more objective
statistical analysis.
The results also have important implications
for management. PPP projects encourage
innovative activities, specifically R&D activities.
This allows companies to sign important
contracts with the government. Furthermore
not only can technology be transferred but it
can help companies achieve important synergies
within their own organization.
An interesting future topic of research could
be to analyse the influence of other factors such
as public incentives and requirements useful in
the procurement process and also innovation
and quality in PPP projects. ■
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